The term “representation” in this paper is taken in the sense that was given it by the grammarians and logicians of Port-Royal. The semiotic experiment attempted here explores the fluctuations of meaning produced by interferences between textual and figurative representation within one picture. Examples such as the portrait with its presentation of the subject and the topographical city plan with its representation of space by drawing and typographic naming of places provide the foundation for a more in-depth exploration of the Ex-voto of 1662, by Philippe de Champaigne. This painting is an exceptional illustration of the interference between image and text.

In the following lines, I am attempting a “semiotic experiment” along guidelines which were already defined in the seventeenth century by the Port Royal grammarians and logicians. This experiment consists of investigating the complex fluctuation of meaning produced by the interferences between texts and images, inscriptions and figures, in one and the same surface of representation.

If one takes as a guideline for the whole problematic the general theory of the sign as it is formulated in the pages of the Grammaire General de Port Royal and, above all, the Logique of Port Royal—two texts which constitute a sort of chart of modern rationalism—one is struck by the fact that this theory of signs follows a double model, iconical and scriptural. The two paradigms that these works use to illustrate their definition of sign/representation are the geographical map and canvas painting—more specifically, portrait painting. When the Port Royal logicians intended to illustrate the traditional difference between the natural and the conventional sign, the additional paradigm of the picture-reflection of man in a mirror was introduced as a model for the first type while the written word remained as a model for the second.

There would be much to write on the question of the overlapping and shifting among the various sign classifications and the representation-functions they suggest. I will, however, restrict myself to a couple of remarks concerning this subject.

The model provided by geographical maps—those drafted by draftsmen and engineers who were sympathetic to the outlook of Port Royal—seems appropriate to exemplify what one might call the transitive dimension of the sign: every sign represents something every sign makes present something that is not, or no longer, present. Thus, the map of Paris puts under my eyes, through a sort of hypotypical
iconicity, a Paris I have never seen, and will never see, as the real configuration of the thing itself. Thus, a draftsman named Gombrich placed in the upper left-hand corner of his map an actual landscape entitled “Paris viewed from Mont Martre,” and in the lower right-hand corner, delineated small human figurines on a fictitious hill from which they contemplated Paris as they would, indeed if such a hill had existed in the neighborhood of Charenton. (Actually, they view the map as we do.) Most of the Paris buildings are represented through their eye-level plane and not through their picture seen from above.

Nevertheless, to return to the exemplification devised by the Port Royal logicians, when we confront such a map we say “this is Paris,” and quite rightly so. Therefore, every sign/representation achieves a “reality effect” or “truth effect” whose textual equivalent is “this is . . .”

However, the portrait as a model exemplifies the reflexive dimension of the sign. Indeed, every sign is tantamount to a presentation of the very function of representation. In the very instant when it renders present a being that is absent (or dead), the sign doubles or reflects the operation of representation itself.

The character of representation-presentation of the sign is especially obvious in the portrait. In it, the “I” represents itself but also presents itself to itself through the sign which stands for it—as it does, more generally, in every sign/representation. Every sign causes a coming to the fore of the concept of subject.

Yet whether one considers the portrait or the map, the values of the traced line, of the sketch and of the intention behind the sketch proclaim the significant intention behind its inscription, or its “scription.” Not only is the map a delineation, a drawing, it becomes a true representation only when it is invaded by written names which identify it as a sign/representation of the very spots which are their actual loci. It is, therefore, not surprising that the logicians of Port Royal, who followed the mainstream of Western philosophical tradition, are opposed to natural signs—whose model was the visible image of a man in a mirror—in favor of the conventional sign whose relationships are arbitrary and depend on social convention; it is not surprising that they should have placed at the top of their typology of signs the conventionality of the visible and written word, this drafted representation of a language instance supposed to represent thought.

In this sense, the “portrait” exemplified by the well-known portrait of Saint Cyran by de Champagne partakes, more than the map, of the mirror-image quality of a man looking at himself in a mirror as well as of the inscription quality of a name written on a plane surface (though the map was called portrait or portrait as in the seventeenth century). And this is less the result of a theoretical procedure (the portrait of a man is his natural sign, his visible name as it were) than that of a procedure of inscription, delineation and design, portrait or portrait, one might say. Thus, I must remark upon a detail which is far from being devoid of meaning—at once semiotical, historical and philosophical: what is written on the Saint Cyran portrait is not the name of the model but his age (62) at the time of his death (1643). Thus, a portrait as sign/representation given us as totally faithful, or even truthful, to its model (the transitive dimension) always signifies a certain relationship to death (its reflexive dimension).

This is a point that would warrant a longer development in another study, especially with reference to Port Royal.

I would now like to verify the truth of the above observations with a double experimentation accomplished through an investigation of a specific painting, a painting where conventional signs of language—written words—intervene, appear or intrude in the midst of painterly representation, in the midst of iconical representation. They are “words within painting” and located in a type of painting one would like to call “inverse”: that is, in which painting itself carries its representational intention to such extremity—or accomplishes its transitive capacity (“to represent something”) so perfectly—that its reflexive dimension (“to present the act of representing through representation itself”) becomes somewhat blurred as though things themselves were present on the surface of the canvas, things in a state of absolute presence in painting.

This double experimentation corresponds to a double objective, both theoretico/philosophical and historico/ideological. First, it will enable a precise and critical interrogation of the question of representation in painting or of painting qua
representation, that is, of the functioning of the symbolic function of painting. Its method is the placing of painting in a double situation of crisis, one in which a heterogenous element is introduced into the picture: written words, which belong to another semiotic substance. They are an interrogation of the “same” through the “other,” an interrogation that is all the more intense as the reader is not conscious of the written characters when he reads them but only grasps the ideas signified by these letters organized into words; and yet the reader has access to such ideas only through the mediation of the signs. Such is the paradox of the presence/absence of the sign so vividly perceptible throughout classical literature. It is this paradox which is necessarily brought to the fore by the inscription of words in the very midst of a picture, since representation in painting, whatever its mimetic capacity may be (or perhaps because of this capacity), realizes exactly a process that is inverse to reading: through its freezing or fixing our gaze on the representational sign, it conceals from it the represented thing.

Another paradox is the coming to the fore of what one might call a representative apex or climax within representation itself and through the phenomenon of representation. This climax is caused by a sort of internal excess of representational functioning, by the becoming, as it were, “haywire” of this representational machine. We have here a hypertrophy of the figurative functioning which is tantamount to an interrogation of the “same” by the “same.” We have here a sort of blind man’s bluff played by the representational sign. Far from causing the recognition of the represented thing within the sign which represents it, far from pretending that the sign does not exist in order to attain representation, the represented thing seems to be in praeentia in the picture itself. In both cases, the critique of representation presents itself as a crisis of representation.

As we said above, the second objective of this experiment is historical and ideological. It is inscribed within the framework of a history of symbolic forms, in the sense of the terminology of Cassirer. The examples that will be presented, and which look somewhat marginal at a superficial glance, aim at proving that the rational process which produces them in our imagination (to speak, again, like Cassirer) is historically inseparable from their own exaggeration and transgression. Thus, the intuition of written words in pain-

terly representation, their forcing us to read signs inscribed in a simulacrum of real presence, manifests the reappearance of a residue that the representational apparatus constantly tries to control or master: transcendental forces, the irreductible otherness of desire, hunger for the absolute, the irreductibility of indetermination, the intrusion of a deathly violence into the art work—a violence which contemporary philosophical reflection attributes to the sublime, to the post-modern, etc. . . .

The Picture
I am writing here about a very distinctive picture. It belongs to the classical tradition, to French culture and to the sphere of Port Royal—that is, to the specific locus where the theory of the sign/representation was elaborated in the first place. This theory, to this day in France, is the necessary and unavoidable historical and philosophical reference for scientific thinking dealing with language and the sign. It is a painting by Philippe de Champaigne (figure 1), painted in 1662, which evokes and glorifies a miracle which had visited his own daughter.10

The Champaigne picture is an ex-voto—in other words, a demonstration of the way in which a painting as picture, as representation, shies away from itself in order to become a spiritual instrument for adoring God and becomes a practical means toward accomplishing spiritual exercises. It is a demonstration of the way in which mimetic representation deconstructs itself into the sacred narrativity of an image which transforms itself into a text.

How is this done? Through the mere inscription of a clearly and explicitly readable text within a painting, a text which hinders contemplation not of the picture but in the picture itself, so that it causes it to oscillate between a sign that merely signifies and an image which represents.

Being inscribed within the picture, the readable text acquires an anti-natural visibility which functions as an anti-visuality and antagonizes the overt visuality of the painting. But conversely, it is through the inscription of a text in its own space that the visible image acquires an unnatural legibility. And this, in turn, prevents the legibility of the text from becoming a mere readability and imposes on the written signs the opaque quality of abstract images.
Even though we view the image as a transparent, transitive representation of things and beings, we cannot fail to observe the presence in it of excessive and incoherent elements, of enigmas. Notwithstanding the fact that a rigorous, almost cubistic, organization organizes a complex geometry of straight angles, triangles, rectangles and cubes, each placed in a situation of conflict in respect to the other, a conflict emerges beneath the appearance of identifiable objects. Hyper-realistic details spring out all over the scene: nails are stuck in the floorboards, sinews of wood appear in the boards, paint peels off the back wall. This produces in the very midst of the linearity of the geometrical structure—an effect of reality that is at once powerful and desultory.\footnote{11}

Light seems to come from the upper left-hand corner of the painting and is regularly distributed over the various object surfaces. The ray of light, however, falls from above without illuminating any specific object. It is at once within representation and outside it, present in it without having a representational function: it appears arbitrary.

Two “narrative figures” are placed harmonically in the picture, two Port Royal nuns, who are represented with folded hands. Yet one of them is kneeling while the other one is reclining on a chaise longue. Thus, only one of the two shows the totality of the external signs of prayer, the folded hands and the kneeling posture.

The Text
These incoherences and enigmas refer us to something more that is located in the left-hand corner: a text. This perfectly readable text consists of three parts which are graphically as well as visually distinct; each part is differentiated from the other through indents or through the style of the letters.\footnote{12}

The first part is: “To Christ, the sole physician for the souls and bodies.” The second part, linked to the first syntactically though not typographically, is a very long sentence: “Sister Catherine Suzanne de Champaigne—after a 14 month fever which terrified the physicians through its persistence and the seriousness of its symptoms; when half her body was paralyzed, Nature exhausted, and her physicians had given her up, having joined in prayer Mother Catherine Agnes, in one instant of time recovered her perfect health—offers herself again” that is, “to Christ.” The third part is a sentence com-
pletely separated from the second one through an alinea. It is syntactically and typographically autonomous: “Philippe de Champaigne, this picture of such a great miracle and testimony of his joy, he placed it beside (God)” that is, he “presented it to (God)” in the year 1662.”

The use of Latin and of its specific syntactic order enabled the writer—not Champaigne but Antoine Arnauld—to compose his text according to a disposition which fulfills both the syntactical and the scriptural demands.

Three remarks on the text: First, the sentences “to Christ... Sister Catherine Suzanne de Champaigne... offers herself” and “Philippe de Champaigne... presented in 1662” delineate a space of signification of which they form the grammatical (syntactic) and typographic (inscriptionary) frame.

Second, the first of these two sentences is performative in character: performatives are indicative utterances which present themselves as descriptions of events but are endowed with the extraordinary property of accomplishing the event they are describing through the very utterance of the description itself. Indeed, it is at the very moment when Sister Catherine utters the words through which she offers herself again to Christ that the act of offering is accomplished. The present tense of the indicative mode that is used would be sufficient in itself to indicate that. Yet, by giving the verb the third person form and, even more so, by writing down the complete formula, the act of inscribing as well as the surface on which it is written acquire a final value.

The second expression is constative: it designates the historical presence of an event which took place in 1662 and in which Philippe de Champaigne presented (“beside” the text) the picture of the perpetual offering of herself made by his daughter, Sister Catherine Suzanne.

This detailed description of mine may be deemed too finical. Nevertheless, it seems to me justified by the mere fact that the Latin text was written by the great Arnauld, the author of the Logique de Port Royal.

Third, the first two sections of the written text are inscribed syntactically as well as typographically within a framework that is constituted by the performative utterance, “To Christ...

... Sister C. ... offers herself.” The words that are framed-in narrate a story, the story of an illness and of its miraculous cure. This being so, the global meaning of the text is somewhat ambivalent: the miracle appears both as the cause and as the effect of the offering and of the vow. Yet the narrative is part of the formula. It is integrated into the spatial totality of the text. The events that are recounted are no longer the elements of a past history but are now those of a relation in praesentia between the nun and Christ. The gift made to the church by the painter is shown as a permanent gift. The narrative in the past tense becomes an integral part of the in praesentia formula expressing the vow. Thus, narrative representation becomes a permanent presentation.

The last section of the text (the second sentence) is a signature of the work. This signature is not exterior to the picture since it designates “this picture,” the whole painting, through its use of the demonstrative pronoun. Yet it is itself within the picture since there is no rupture between the picture and the text. It is really the transgression of the signature function in a painting. It is not a sign of property but the expression of a feeling (joy) and the designation of an operation that is constitutive of the total picture—not as a construct fabricated by an author but as an “offering.”

Interferences
We must now turn to the interferences between the text and the picture proper. The text is inscribed in the very surface of the painting, in the plane of representation itself. By virtue of this fact, it makes visible a sphere that can be described as representing one of the conditions of the possibility of the whole representational apparatus.

Concerning the typography, analysis arrives at opposite results. The written characters belong to the sphere of the visual and yet function as “transparent” elements during the reading (are not perceived per se but are transcended toward a referent). Nevertheless, they need a support in order to be written, a “real” and neutral support which enables their visibility. On the contrary, the represented objects are visible from the outset, but visible on a surface which is at once real and invisible (the canvas) and also transparent (is used as the plane for representation).
The introduction into the plane of representation of both written letters and represented objects causes a mutual subversion of inscription and representation. The plane of representation is made visible and is perceived as such. The inscription surface becomes invisible or transparent; it is not perceived as such. From now on, the text floats between two kinds of space: represented space and real space. It is written on a liminal zone which it simultaneously designates. It is the constitutive limit of the representational apparatus. And yet, conversely, the figures do not cease to be represented but are transformed into signs that “signify” to us and have become the vehicles for another meaning and of “presence” or presentations situated “this side” of their own representations or beyond it.

Two additional remarks: concerning the role of light as a composition device and the additional ray of light: their corresponding element in the text is the story of the illness and the formula of the vow. But this correspondence is inverse. Whereas a performative speech act frames in the text syntactically and typographically, the ray of light ruptures the unity of the composition through its falling from above and in the center from an external source.

Concerning the proper names and the portraits: the iconic equivalent of the proper name is the portrait. In the text, three proper names are mutually linked by a remarkable series of identities: Mother Catherine Agnes, Sister Catherine Suzanne de Champagne, Philippe de Champagne. Religious and biological filiation coincide in the name of the miraculously saved woman. Only the name of Christ remains isolated. Two names have iconic equivalents: the portraits of the Mother and the Sister. Two figures are missing, that of Christ and of Philippe de Champagne. Christ, who is metaphorically the subject of the picture as “physician of the bodies and the souls”—the source and the author of the miracle—remains invisible, present only through his signs, the cross and the ray of light. As for Champagne, he is metonymically “inside” the painting, through the signature which represents his authorship, and through the part of the text which attributes the authorship to him.

_A third stage: the internal functioning of representation mediating between text and picture._
The reclining nun looks out toward a specific objective. If one should extrapolate in the direction indicated by her gaze, one would not fail to encounter the first words of the text, “Christo unus Medicus.” She is represented not as engaged in reading this portion of the text inscribed on the left of the picture but as the name of Christ to whom she offers herself and to whom she is praying in the representation. We have here an exchange operation between text and picture. In the text, she offers herself to Christ; in the picture, she receives from Christ the miraculous gift of health.16

On the left, a visible and legible text is displayed as if it were on a page, but this page is the painting. On the extreme right, an object is visible resting on the chair, a closed book, visible but not legible. It is an image, a sign, of a possible reading, just as the visible text is the sign of a real vision; the sign-picture is the sign of a representation of this vision.

In the midst of the representation proper, in the lap of the reclining nun, one can see an object which lies open near the folded hands. It is a small portable reliquary which is half open. It contains a relic but is at the same time a pious picture. Thus, in her lap, a picture is open like a book—not closed like the book on the right, but open. It is an image that is not seen, just as the book is not read, but is, nevertheless, recognizable. It is a reliquary—that is, a sort of intermediary sign between text and picture. It conceals and shows, simultaneously, a thing-sign and a sign-thing: a relic.

Is not the whole picture the transformation of painting into a relic, that is, into a sign of efficaciousness which transcends its own representation? And this transformation is achieved by the text, especially through the last sentence in the text.

Thus, this tiny object placed in the very midst of representation designates the production and generation process of the global representation, both text and picture, through its relationship to the book and to the text. A mere element inside the totality, it signifies the generating of the totality, the double and mutual transformation of a text into a picture and of a picture into a text.17

Returning to the historical problem that I addressed at the beginning of this study, what I have attempted to do here is to show how a series of semiotic interferences, of semiotic overlapping, is underpinned by a theology of Nature and
Grace, of Man and the Divine, both Cartesian and Augustinian in character, at a turning point in seventeenth-century France. In other words, I have tried to show how representation is underpinned by a specific ideological, historical, social, cultural configuration.

In classical epistemé one can detect a counter-intention which is in part the manifestation of an archaic disposition—perhaps of an “archeology of knowledge”—in the representational dimensions of language, discourse, image and figure. But this disposition is also the manifestation of the internal permanent crisis, that of modern representation around 1662. It is this crisis that produced a form of space which belonged to neither the order of the picture nor the order of the textual. This space testified to the existence of an “other” reality which was read by Port Royal as the manifestation of the “radically other,” of the God who, like his Grace, is permanently absent-present.18

The votive function in painting
The Champaigne picture was sometimes designated as Two Port Royal Nuns or Mother Agnes and Sister Suzanne de Champaigne before being given its present title, The Ex-voto of 1662. This indecision itself is significant. The genre of the ex-voto is part and parcel of a very long and archaic tradition which cannot be described here in its full historical development.19 Only two of its essential features may be brought to the fore. The first is the inscription, the written trace which marks “the thing” presented or offered as an offering or as a “grace,” as a sign of gratitude for a personal gift received from God. The other is the character of “double” in the ex-voto. As often as not, the ex-voto is the iconic representation of a part of the body of the person who made the vow. In other words, the votum is both the religious ritual of the offering and the object which is offered. Yet, being unable to offer the actual organ which had been the object of the miraculous cure, the donor offered the double of his hand, eyes, belly, sex, breasts, ears or feet. The idea of the ex-voto, therefore, oscillates between the inscription and the “double,” between the written “name,” which designates the intention of the offerer, and the “double,” which functions as a simulacrum of the miraculously-saved organ and as a sort of magical metonymy.

Things in painting: the study of the ex-voto by Champaigne allows us an indirect approach into this theme precisely because of the votive function triggered by the text written on the left of the picture. This is a function which transcends both the representational apparatus which underpins it and its metaphoricity, whether mimetic or analogical, arbitrary or conventional.

Finally, I would like to return for a moment to the question of the forms and structures of the representational sign to emphasize that the written characters which resolve themselves into words on the surface of the picture have an essential function: causing a state of crisis within the representational sign concerning the formal and structural conditions of possibility of this sign. They do this through their exhibiting of these conditions, that is, by exhibiting the very representation (the picture) these conditions made possible.

Through the writing inscribed within the picture, it is the plane of representation which is brought to the fore. But it is a plane which is “denigated” by represented space and by the figures that it contains. Such writing is tantamount to a showing of the limits of representation. Such a showing is not merely the framework within which the inscription functions but its total sphere of intentionality. It causes a fragmentation of the apperceptive consciousness, which is a witness of the repression to which representation is submitted while it is also an active agent in the global enforcing of this repression. This is the very definition of Freudian “denigration.”
Endnotes

1. The reader will recognize this title as an allusion to the book of Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*, a work which contributed a great deal to a definition of what Foucault himself called the "classical epistème."


11. On this question, see B. Dorival's analysis of the spatial treatment of the *Ex Voto*, op. cit., p. 149.


16. The typography of the inscription "within" the painting causes a remarkable production of meaning. "Christ uni medicum animarum et corporum" can be read from the outset as a formula which constitutes Christ as the destinary of the whole painting and subsequently as the complement of attribution of the verbal phrase "se iterum offert." In this sense, he is the destinary of the offering of Sister Catherine de Sainte Suzanne de Champagne, a specific figure in the iconic "narrative" engaged in renewing her vows. This remark was suggested to me by Professor Marc Domini. 17. The structural Greimasian model of the representation can be laid out in the following manner: 1) A destinary Christ, 2) A subject (the heroine); Sister Catherine, 3) A textual enumeration (within the text) of a series of negative functions: the opponent (the fever, the symptoms, paralyses), 4) Helpers (adjuvants) who turn into opponents or traitors (anti-subjects); the physicians, 5) A true helper with a positive function; Mother Catherine Agnes and prayer, 6) Victory of the heroine through the final transmission of the valued object: health.

